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Abstract. We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under
proportional representation where `citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs
and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as
functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from holding o±ce and
their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority
or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be `disconnected'. We then look at how the
coalition formation game a®ects the incentives for party formation. Our model
explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and
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11. Introduction
In democracies that use proportional representation (PR), it is unusual for a single
party to control more than half the seats in parliament. In a study of 313 elections in
11 democracies in Europe (see Diermeier and Merlo (2001)) from 1945-1997, it was
found that only 20 of the elections returned a single party with more than half the
seats in parliament. Hence, in such democracies minority and coalition governments
are more prevalent. Moreover, coalition governments di®er in the number of partic-
ipants as well as the ideological cohesion of their members. For example, in a study
of ¯fteen European democracies in the post war period, Gallagher, Laver and Mair
(1995) ¯nd that about 35% of coalitions were minimal winning, 36% were minority
coalitions while the rest of the coalitions (29%) were surplus coalitions. Laver and
Scho¯eld (1990) and Indridason (2001) report instances of ideologically disconnected
coalition governments being formed over the same time period in Europe.
The recent game theoretic models of PR, notably Diermeier and Merlo (2000) and
Baron and Diermeier (2001), (collectively referred to as BDM) employ the e±cient
bargaining approach to coalition politics to provide an explanation for the size diver-
sity of coalitions. According to this approach, the party in charge of putting together
a coalition (called the formateur) can buy the support of other parties by adapting
a compromise policy position or by making side payments in return for support. Us-
ing this they are able to generate equilibrium governments which can be minority,
minimum winning or surplus. This is a major point of departure from the previous
theoretical literature since Riker (1962) which had consistently predicted minimum
winning coalitions in equilibrium. However, these recent papers do not consider the
issue of disconnected coalitions1. They also do not look at whether their results are
consistent with endogenous party entry.
1Brams et al (2001) is one of the few papers which explicitly addresses this issue.
2In this paper we construct a game theoretic model of PR which endogenizes party
formation, voting as well as coalitional politics. Our paper shares some features with
the aforementioned literature in that we also use the formateur selection procedure2
but precludes the possibility of e±cient bargaining (in particular, of being able to
make unlimited side transfers) or the ability to be able to commit to a policy at the
government formation stage. Instead, we assume, that under a coalition government,
the implemented policy is approximated by the seat-weighted average of the ideal
policies of the coalition partners and each party in the coalition receives a share of
power (to be interpreted as rents from o±ce or directed transfers in the paper) in
proportion to its seats. This approach allows us to formalize the issue of how party
entry and government formation are a®ected by the relative importance of ideology to
rents from o±ce. In doing so, we generate a number of refutable predictions about the
role of policy motivation vis-a-vis political power in the determination of government
formation as well as political party formation.
The particular assumption about the bargaining outcome has strong empirical sup-
port. Empirical studies of power sharing among coalition partners (see Browne and
Fendreis (1980) and Laver and Scho¯eld, (1990)) have found substantial evidence
that coalition partners share cabinet portfolios in proportion to their relative seat
shares. Since a large bulk of political power is vested in various ministerial o±ces,
the politician in charge of a particular ministry is entitled to that power as well as
the right to make a policy in the relevant area.
Our second point of departure from the previous literature concerns our treatment
of the status-quo in the event of the failure to form a government. We assume that
in the event that the attempts at government formation fail, a consensus government
comprised of all the parties is formed. Under such government, the implemented
policy is the seat-weighted average of the ideal points all the members of the legislature
2Ansolabehere et al (2003) provide empirical support for the use of such models
3and the political power is shared in proportion to the seats. Baron and Diermeier, on
the other hand, assume an exogenously given status quo while Diermeier and Merlo
assume it to be equal to the ideal point of one of the parties.
The basic structure of our model can be described as follows: there is a polity
comprised of groups of citizens who share policy preferences. Each group decides
whether or not to form a political party in order to gain representation in the legisla-
ture. Election takes place between the contesting parties and each party gets seats in
the parliament equal to its vote share. This is followed by the process of government
formation. If there exists a party that receives absolute majority, then it is selected
as the formateur, otherwise each party is probabilistically chosen to be the formateur
with the recognition probability equal to its seat share. The formateur invites any
subset of parties in the legislature to form the government.3 If all the invitees agree to
join the government and if the prospective government wins the backing of a majority
of legislators, then the government assumes o±ce. Otherwise a caretaker government
is instituted. The policy choice and the power sharing arrangement between the mem-
ber parties of a government is as described in the earlier paragraph. To sum up, we
model the system of PR by integrating the `citizen-candidate' approach a la Besley
and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) with a variant of the coalition
formation literature.
We now summarize our main results. At the coalition formation stage, we show
how the equilibrium nature of coalitions varies both with the choice of formateur as
well as with changes in the value of ideology to rents from o±ce. For a symmetric
three party case, we completely characterize the equilibrium coalitions. In particular,
we see that there is a non monotonic relation between rents from o±ce and connected
coalitions. The other cases of interest we discuss is where there is a large centrally
located party with two smaller parties on either side and another where the two
3We do not preclude the possibility that the formateur may invite a subset of parties that does
not include itself.
4smaller parties are close to each other. We show how this can lead to disconnected
coalitions, the two small parties by leaving the large party out can appropriate more
rents for themselves. A general result that we get is that when the rents from o±ce
are large enough, equilibrium governments are minimal winning though not minimum
size. At intermediate ranges (of the value of rents from o±ce) we get the various kinds
of coalitions seen in democracies under PR. We then do a two dimensional analogue
with BDM and ¯nd that for their symmetric three party case we get minimum winning
coalitions under the assumptions in our model. The di®erence stems from the fact that
their results (on equilibrium coalition choice) are driven only by the position of the
(exogenously given) status quo and choice of formateur while our results also depend
on the ideological closeness of the parties as well as the trade-o® between rents and
ideology. We then examine what incentives the coalition formation procedure gives
ideological group to form parties. We ¯nd that there exists an equilibrium of the
political game which has the median group (when it is unique) being the only group
to stand for elections and under some con¯gurations, we show that this could in fact
be the unique equilibrium. Hence, this is contrary to the Duvergerian prediction
(see Duverger (1964)) 4that PR promotes more party formation than does Plurality
voting. We further show how political competition can increase with increases in the
value placed to rents from o±ce. In particular, beyond a certain value of the rents,
we get a (non unique) political equilibrium where all the ideological groups contest
for elections.
The next section discusses some more papers which are related to our work. This
is followed by presenting the model, solving the legislative game and then solving
the entire political game. A comparison is done with the BDM papers using a two
dimensional policy space, followed by a robustness analysis by looking at how sensitive
4See Feddersen (1992), Fey (1997) and Palfrey (1989) for formalizations of the Duvergerian hy-
pothesis that Plurality Rule leads to two party rule.
5our results are to the way we model the coalition formation procedure. The ¯nal
section discusses the empirical relevance of our model and concludes.
2. Related literature
Our work is related to several strands in the literature, particularly with several
papers on coalitional bargaining, party positioning and endogenous party formation.
It also draws on the insights provided by classic works on electoral systems, the
activist literature on PR (see Barber (1999) for example ) and several case studies
which throw light on actual coalitional structure.
The study of what type of coalitions will form in equilibrium dates back to Riker
(earlier cit.). However, the concern in Riker's work is with the division of a ¯xed
`pie' which members of the winning coalition are entitled to. Hence, he predicts a
minimum winning coalition i.e. the minimal winning coalition made of the smallest
number of members.5When ideology is considered there are no longer compelling
reasons to predict a minimal winning coalition. Instead, following Axelrod (1970),
the natural thing to predict would be a `minimum winning connected' coalition { i.e.
a coalition that does not leave out a partner who is in between two coalition partners
on the ideological dimension. As pointed out, until the papers by BDM, most of the
theoretical papers did make such predictions (see Austen Smith and Banks (1988),
Baron (1989, 1991,1998) and Lupia and Strom (1995) for instance).
There are also a fair number of models of party formation/strategic entry, starting
from the `citizen candidate' models of endogenous candidate entry to more recent pa-
pers by Riviere (2000), Morelli (2001) and Osborne and Tourky (2002) (in the recent
papers a distinction is made between a candidate and a party).6 These papers either
5For some of the theoretical papers on coalition formation both with a constant pie as well as a
non constant sum pie see Ray and Vohra (1997) and the references in the survey by Bloch (1997)
6In recent papers by Levy (2002) and Jackson and Moselle (2002) the role of a party when the
space is multidimensional rather than unidimensional is analyzed. For a recent survey on coalitions
6assume that the winner is selected by plurality rule or they model the post election
policy outcome as a majority rule game, thus missing one of the most important as-
pects of PR which is coalition formation. There are also papers dealing with strategic
entry under more general outcome functions most notably Dutta, Jackson and LeBre-
ton (2000) but the generality of the paper does not allow them to generate any sharp
predictions except that under complete information at least one player (candidate)
will behave strategically.
The fact that PR promotes diversity has been made by Ortuno Ortin (1997). The
paper assumes that the policy is a weighted average of the two parties policy with the
weights being proportional to seat shares. The main aim is to provide an explanation
of why policies pursued might deviate from the median voter's position. Hamlin and
Hjortland (2000) integrate this approach with the citizen candidate literature and
De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2001) consider model with non strategic parties but
strategic voters. Both papers predict two parties under proportional representation
contrary to empirical evidence. Moreover, the assumption of vote weighted average
does not capture the institutional details of coalition formation and government policy
making which is an important aspect of democracies under PR.
A more complete analysis of the electoral process has been made by Austen Smith
and Banks (earlier cit.), Baron (1993) Roemer (2001) and Baron and Diermeier (ear-
lier cit.). Baron and Diermeier also note that with `strategic voting' minority parlia-
ments may form in equilibrium and voters do not always vote for the party closest to
their ideal point. The ¯rst result is of interest as it provides a justi¯cation for dealing
with the coalition formation stage under a minority parliament. These papers do not
deal with party formation and their parties are only endogenous in the sense that
they choose positions.
and party formation, see Dhillon (2003) which also discusses some other recent work on political
parties and coalitions.
7In summary, we di®er from these papers in two major ways. First, we make dif-
ferent assumptions about coalitional bargaining (in particular, by assuming no com-
mitment and non transferable utility). Second, we integrate the `institution free'
citizen-candidate approach to politics with the rich institutional details of parliamen-
tary democracy under PR.
3. The Model
In this section we formalize the political process under PR. We denote by N =
f1;2;:::;Ng the set of groups of citizens in the polity where 1 · N < 1. Let Ni
denote the measure of citizen belonging to group i . Let X denote the policy space.
The payo® of a (representative)citizen belonging to group i is denoted by
¡u(jxi ¡ xj) + T
where x 2 X is the policy implemented, xi is the ideal policy of party i and T is
the transfer of money received by the citizen. The interpretation of T is the amount
of directed transfer made to that group as opposed to the policy which has a public
good interpretation. We shall throughout assume that a group which is a part of the
government receives a transfer ¸P where ¸ is the relative size (seat share) of the group
in terms of the number of parties in the government. This is the main distinction
from being in government and out of government Only members of a government
are able to hold ministries and hence make directed transfers to their own groups.
This is the particular way we interpret the rents from o±ce and following the strong
empirical evidence (as discussed in the Introduction) we assume the ministries (which
we assume is vested with the ability to make these transfers) to be split according to
8party size.7 We assume that u(0) = 0;u0 > 0;u00 ¸ 0. The political process can be
described by the following four stages.
(1) Candidate Entry Each group simultaneously decides whether or not to con-
test the elections. There is a cost ± > 0 of contesting the elections. Let
ei = 1(0) indicate that group i contests (does not contest) the elections.
Hence, given an entry pro¯le e = (e1;e2;¢¢¢ ;eN), the set of parties contesting
an election can be denoted by C(e) = fi 2 N : ei = 1g.
(2) Elections Citizens simultaneously vote over the set of contesting parties
C(6= ;). We assume throughout this model that voting is costless and each
citizen votes for the party that is closest to his ideal policy. Upon elections,
each party receives seats in the parliament in proportion to its relative vote
share. In reality there are minimum °oor requirements and the integer con-
straints that must be taken into account. In our model we abstract from these
considerations.
(3) Government Formation Let (C;Si;fxig) denote a parliament comprised of
C(> 0) parties where Si denotes party i's seat share and xi its ideal point.
The process of government formation is comprised of three stages: formateur
selection, proto-coalition formation and the vote of con¯dence.
(a) Formateur Selection If there is a party k such that Sk > 1
2, then party k
is asked to be the formateur. If there is a hung parliament, i.e., if Si · 1
2
for all i 2 C, then each party is asked to become the formateur with
probability Si. The formateur selection process described here (variously
7Note that we could alternately have assumed that people care for policy and rents (or di-
rected transfers) in the ratio ® and 1 ¡ ®: Hence, payo® for a citizen of group i can be written
as ¡®u(jxi ¡ xj) +(1 ¡ ®)T: The comparative statics that we do would have been in terms of the
marginal rate of substitution between policy bene¯ts and rents. This makes no qualitative change,
so we keep the simpler formulation.
9called proportional selection or random recognition) seems to ¯t the data
well (see Diermeier and Merlo (2001)).
(b) Proto-Coalition Selection The formateur asks any subset of parties in the
legislature, D, to form a government. D is called the proto-coalition. All
the members of the proto-coalition must simultaneously decide whether
or not to accept the o®er. If the o®er is unanimously accepted, then D
goes on to seeks the vote of con¯dence, otherwise a caretaker government
is instituted.
(c) Vote of Con¯dence If a proto-coalition decides to accept the formateur's
o®er, it must seek the vote of con¯dence from the legislature. Each mem-
ber of the legislature simultaneously votes to approve or to disapprove the
proto-coalition. If the proto-coalition wins more than 50% of the votes,
then it goes on to form a government, otherwise a caretaker government
is instituted.
(4) Policy Selection Let D denote the government in o±ce. Depending upon
the outcome of the government formation stage, there could either be a single
party government, coalition government or a caretaker government in power.
There are two cases to consider.
² Single Party or Coalition Government: Let ¼i denote the relative seat
share of party i in the government. We assume that the policy chosen
by such a government is given by
P
k2D ¼kxk and each member of each
party in power gets a transfer equal to 1 P
i2D ¼iP.
² Consensus Government: In case of a caretaker government, the policy
implemented is given by
P
i2C Sixi and each member of the legislature
gets a transfer P. In other words, a caretaker government is the same as
a consensus government formed by all parties in the legislature.
We assume that if no group decides to form a party, then each citizen
receives a payo® u;.
104. Solving the Legislative Model
We will solve the game backwards. Thus, we will ¯rst solve for the coalition forma-
tion and policy making stage for a given legislature. In the next section we shall look
at party formation and study the incentives generated by the parliamentary game for
party formation. Thus, in this section we start with a given seat share for each party.
There are two stages in the legislative game viz. government formation and policy
making.
4.1. The Government Formation and Policy Making game. We assume that
each party in the legislature acts as a cohesive decision making unit which tries
to maximize the payo® of its representative member. Once the coalition wins the
con¯dence (investiture) vote, policy making and division of the spoils of o±ce is
decided by the bargaining among members The bargaining procedure is of course
complicated by the fact that we have a non constant sum game. Thus, we do not
explicitly model this but simply assume that each members strength is the weight it
has in the government and thus they will share the rents from o±ce in that ratio and
the implemented policy will be a seat weighted outcome of the members ideal points.
Let vi(D) denote the average payo® of a member of party i when D is the ruling
coalition. If i = 2 D, then vi(D) = ¡u(jxi ¡ xDj) and if i 2 D, then vi(D) = ¡u(jxi ¡
xDj) + 1
sDP where sD is the `size' i.e. the seat shares of coalition D:8 Let vi(C)
denote the payo® of a member of party i when there is a consensus government.
At the vote of con¯dence stage, the members of party i will vote for the proposed
government D if vi(D) ¸ vi(;) (we assume that when indi®erent, a party member
votes for the proposed government). Let A(D) denote the set of parties that would
vote for the proposed government D and let sA(D) denote its size. If sA(D) > 1
2; then
D forms the government. Let W denote the set of proto coalitions that will win the
8Note that party i receives ¼iP part of the power. Hence, the per party member share of power
is ¼iP
si : Since ¼i = si
sD; we have the per capita share to be 1
sDP:
11vote of con¯dence. Formally, W ´ fD 2 2C s:t: sA(D) > 1
2g: Now we come to the
proto coalition selection stage. At this stage the formateur k must choose the proto
coalition. Let Y denote the set of proto coalitions that are unanimously preferred
by its constituents over the status quo. Formally, Y ´ fD 2 2Cs.t.vi(D) ¸ vi(Á)g
Thus, every coalition member has a veto power in that it can decide not to be in the
coalition. Hence, unanimity is required among the selected members for a coalition
to be formed. Let Dk denote the proto coalition most preferred by a member of party
k; i.e. Dk=argmaxD2W\Yvk(D): For simplicity, we assume that Dk is unique for each
k (otherwise choose with equal probability): Thus, associated with each formateur
k we have an equilibrium government Dk: Formally, a legislative equilibrium can be
de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 1. A legislative equilibrium is a collection of proto coalition D1;D2;:::;DN
such that 8k 2 C;Dk=argmaxD2W\Yvk(D)
Note that existence is not a problem as the sets W and Y are well de¯ned. Hence,
Dk is well de¯ned.
4.2. De¯ning di®erent coalitions. Before stating our main results on the parlia-
mentary stage it is useful to make precise the types of coalitions we had described in
the introduction. Let (C;Si;fxig) denote a parliament comprised of C(> 0) parties
where Si denotes party i's seat share and xi its ideal point. Let D µ N denote the
coalition in power with ¼i denoting the relative seat share of party i 2 D. Naturally,
for i 2 D, ¼i =
Si P
k2D Sk. Some special cases of interest are
² jDj = 1 - a single party is in power.
²
P
k2D Sk · 1
2 - D is a minority government.
²
P
k2D Sk > 1
2 and 9 i 2 D such that
P
k2Dni Sk > 1




k2D Sk > 1
2 and for any i 2 D,
P
k2Dni Sk · 1
2 - D is a minimal winning
coalition government.
12² D = C - a consensus government.
² C(fxigi2D) denote the convex hull of the ideal points of the coalition partners.
If 9 j 62 D such that xj 2 C(fxigi2D) then D is a disconnected coalition.
Otherwise D is a connected coalition.
The following section characterizes the types of equilibrium coalitions as a function
of policy and power.
5. A symmetric three party characterization and a `limiting result'
Consider a legislature comprised of 3 parties, 1, 2 and 3, with x1 = 0;x2 = x · 1
2
and x3 = 1. We shall further assume that S1 = S2 = S3 = 1
3. Each party has well
de¯ned preferences denoted by a weak ordering Âi over the set of possible coalitions.
If two or more parties prefer a coalition D over the status quo f1;2;3g, then the
D succeeds in forming a government. We will completely characterize the set of
equilibrium coalitions.
5.1. Party 2 as the formateur. First suppose that party 2 is chosen as the for-
mateur. It obviously prefers f2g over any other D and will succeed in forming the
government if f2g Â1 f1;2;3g. 1's payo® from f2g in power is ¡x while his payo®
from f1;2;3g is ¡1+x





which simpli¯es to x · 1
2¡ 3
2P. Hence, if the above condition holds, 2 will successfully
propose a minority government comprised only of itself. It his condition does not hold,
the 2's other alternatives are f1;2g or f1;2;3g or f1;3g. Since f1;2g Â2 f2;3g, 2 will








which simpli¯es to x · 2
7 + 6
7P. Note that 1 will always support f1;2g over f1;2;3g
and hence 2 is assured of winning the vote of con¯dence. If x > 2
7 + 6
7P, then 2's next
13best alternative would be either f2;3g or f1;2;3g. In either case the government is








which simpli¯es to x · ¡1 + 6P. Otherwise 2 will prefer the status quo f1;2;3g.









Figure 1. Coalitions with 2 as Formateur
5.2. Party 1 as the formateur. Let party 1 be the formateur. Its most preferred
government is f1g, which it will succeed in forming if f1g Â2 f1;2;3g, which is same
as




which simpli¯es to x · 1
5 ¡ 3
5P. If the above condition fails to hold, the next best









which boils down to x · 2
7 + 6
7P. If neither f2g nor f1;2g are feasible, then 1 could
propose either f2g;f1;3g or f1;2;3g.
Note that f2g will always get party 2's support. Hence, 1 would propose f2g if
f2g Â1 f1;3g and f2g Â1 f1;2;3g. The former condition is equivalent to x · 1
2 ¡2P
and latter is equivalent to x · 1
2 ¡ 3P. Similar conditions can be obtained for the
range over which f1;3g is the best feasible combination. The following diagram shows
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Figure 2. Coalitions with 1 as Formateur
5.3. Party 3 as the formateur. To study the possible coalitions when party 3
is the formateur, we do a similar exercise of deriving 3's best feasible coalitions.
The following diagram shows the various equilibrium coalitions when party 3 is the
formateur.






Figure 3. Coalitions with 3 as Formateur
5.4. Connected vs. disconnected coalitions. An important insight that the re-
cent empirical work on coalitions has revealed (see Indridason, earlier cit.) is that
disconnected coalitions may be more frequently see where ideology is less important
as compared to rents (or what we also interpret as special transfers as opposed to
policies which a®ect all groups). To see when this may be true more clearly, consider
two particular cases, one where there is a large party which is centrally located and
two smaller parties on either side and another where there are two ideologically sim-
ilar parties with a large party further away from them. We can to ¯x ideas, assume,
as in the symmetric case, that we have parties 1, 2, 3 with ideal points (0;x;1).
S2 ¸ max(S1;S3). Thus, essentially we now introduce asymmetry in party size to see
how that a®ects coalition formation. The closer x is to 1
2, the lower the value of P
needed to get a disconnected coalition. Again, as S2 gets bigger the chance of a dis-
connected coalition increases (until S2 = 1
2): This captures the intuitive phenomenon
that the centrist party is left out as it is asking for too much (in terms of share of
16P). However, this is a special case of a more general result, namely as the value of P
gets larger, the equilibrium coalitions are minimum winning (subject to the formateur
being in the coalition). Hence, in this case the two smallest parties form a coalition
and, being on either side, the coalition is disconnected. On the other hand, when
they are on the same side, we can get again get disconnected coalitions when P is
very high as the far extreme party will call on the smallest partner which may be
farthest from it. In both cases, what is of further interest is to check for consistency
with the entry game which we do in the next section.
In this context we note that the general result when the value of rents become very
high is that every formateur can form a coalition and that will be minimal winning.
We state this formally as follows.
Proposition 1. There exist a value of P beyond which every formateur i 2 N can
form a coalition and that will be a minimum winning coalition, in particular it will
be the smallest minimum winning coalition subject to inclusion of the formateur
Proof. Consider party i 2 N and let M denote the smallest minimum winning coali-
tion subject to inclusion of i and denote by S ¸ 1
2 the relative size of the coalition.
Denote an alternative larger coalition by M0 and its relative size by S0: Note that
there exists P for which uM + P
S > uM0 + P
S0. Hence, a larger coalition is ruled out.
Now we need to show that a smaller coalition will be voted down by a majority.
Denote the smaller coalition by M
00 and its relative size by S
00 < 1
2: It will be voted
against by all members not included in S
00 as long as uÁ + P > uM00: The value of
P which satis¯es both inequalities is the one beyond which all equilibrium coalitions
are minimal winning.
6. Party formation
We are now able to de¯ne the political equilibrium. We ¯rst de¯ne the entry stage
equilibrium and then the political equilibrium.
17De¯nition 2. Entry-stage Equilibrium: A pro¯le e of entry decisions constitutes an
equilibrium if, for all i ²C; Vi(C) ¡ ± > Vi(C0); where Vi(C) (respectively Vi(C0)) is
the expected utility of party i from contesting (respectively not contesting) and the
set of entrants is denoted by C and C0 = C ¡ i:
De¯nition 3. Political Equilibrium: A political equilibrium is a collection fD¤;e¤g
where D¤ = (D1;D2;:::;DN) is a collection of equilibrium proto coalitions of the
government formation game and e¤ is an entry-pro¯le such that,
(1) 8k 2 C;Dk=argmaxD2W\Yvk(D) and
(2) e¤ is an equilibrium of the entry game given the proto-coalition decision func-
tions.
6.1. Results. Given these de¯nitions we can now easily show existence.
Proposition 2. A Political equilibrium exists.
Proof. The number of players (1 · N < 1) and the strategy set is ¯nite. Hence, the
conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium holds. In particular, the government
formation subgame associated with each formateur also has an equilibrium as Dk is
well de¯ned.
Now since the entry decision of each party is dependent on the decisions by other
parties it is not very di±cult to see that we get multiple equilibria. We shall demon-
strate this by giving examples of such multiplicity. However, as our next proposition
shows, if the median is unique, then the median group being the only group to form
a party is always an equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If the median group is unique, there exists a political equilibrium
in which the median group stands uncontested and implements its ideal policy in
parliament.
18Proof. If the median group forms a party no group can get more than half the votes
by standing on its own.
As the median party retains its absolute majority it still becomes the formateur
and implements its ideal point. Thus any group i by launching a party incurs a net
cost since its change of utility from standing is U(xm)¡U(xm)¡± = ¡± < 0: Hence,
no unilateral deviation is pro¯table. Any group by forming a party only undergoes a
cost.9
It is natural at this stage to ask what (if anything) can be said about Duverger's
law. Non-Duvergerian predictions for PR have been made (see the papers cited in
section 2), in particular showing that only two parties can form under PR. The
assumptions are open to question but clearly it is worth investigating if strategic
entry in our particular framework can give rise to non Duvergerian predictions. An
interesting point in this context made by Morelli (earlier cit.) is that in a multi-
district model if the population distribution across districts is su±ciently dissimilar
Duverger's predictions are reversed. We demonstrate that even in a one district
scenario we can get more parties under plurality voting than under PR.
There are three groups with ideal points 0;x < 1
2;1: We further assume that Ni =
1
3 8 i. We wish to look at conditions under which the median group forming the
party is the unique equilibrium. In other words, contra Duvergerian prediction we
have only one party under PR. We also examine under what conditions we have
another equilibrium in which all the groups will stand. To understand why the unique
equilibrium could be party with ideal point x standing, note that the group further
away from x (i.e. the party with ideal point 1) may wish to withdraw in order to
prevent the minimum winning coalition of 0;x which will be worse for the group than
if the ideal policy of the middle group x is implemented. The conditions that need
9This is not robust in the sense that it depends on the simultaneity of the game. Note that this
non robustness is true for the citizen candidate model as well.
19to be satis¯ed for this is that the equiprobable chance of the three coalitions that
occur when all three groups form parties must be less than the utility from x being
implemented with certainty. In this, we have di®erent cases to consider. The ¯rst is
when there a coalition between the parties with ideal point 0 and 1 when the party
with ideal point 0 is the formateur and a minority government when the party with
ideal point x is the formateur and a caretaker government when the party with ideal
point 1 is the formateur.
Proposition 4. Let there be three equal sized groups, 1,2 and 3 with the ideal points
given by 0;x < 1











exists a unique political equilibrium where the party with ideal point x contests when













3 jx ¡ 1j+ P
3 ¡± < ¡jx ¡ 1j












¯ < jxj implies that if all three groups have
contested (and by sincere voting gained equal seat shares in the legislature) the party
with ideal point 0 as formateur will from a minimum winning coalition with the party
with ideal point x; while the party with ideal point x will form a minority coalition
at low values of P and the status quo will be implemented when the party with ideal
point 1 is the formateur. Clearly, this is not restrictive in that in the event that the
party with ideal point 0 can form a minority government, the incentive for the party
with ideal point 1 to drop out is even greater. Given that, we see by condition (1)
that the group with ideal point 1 prefers to drop out which leads to the policy x being
implemented with certainty. Condition (2) makes sure that group 2 would always like
to form a party and contest the elections.
The intuition for this is that the further extreme party (with ideal point 1) prefers
x as the policy than a coalition which would lead to x
2 being the policy and hence
drops out to give the middle party a majority. Thus, while several formalizations of
20Duverger's law relied on voters behaving strategically (see references earlier cit.), we
have shown that even with sincere voting the intuition is not very di®erent if there is
strategic behavior on the part of parties. In particular, notice that the condition for
uniqueness under PR is weaker than that under plurality voting (PV) in the sense













3 jx ¡ 1j + P ¡ ± < ¡jx ¡ 1j would need
to hold as in the event of a tie there is a on third probability of the party with ideal
point 1 being the winner and hence appropriating all the P:
We now look at entry-proofness for the two asymmetric cases described in the
discussion on connected vs. disconnected coalitions. Recall that we had three parties
1,2,3 with ideal points (0,x;1). s2 ¸ max(s1;s3) The closer x is to 1
2 the lower the value
of P to get disconnected coalitions. Again ;as sx gets bigger chances of a disconnected
coalition increases (until s2 = 1): We can see why at low P and reasonably moderate
± an extreme party may want to drop out.
Now consider the three parties 1,2,3 with ideal points (0,x;1) with s3 ¸ max(s1;s2).
It is easy to see that with low P the status quo is implemented. As an example of
entry (non proofness) consider x = ² close to 0. It is easy to see that there exists P
such that

















But notice that this is not entry proof. This is because ¡jxj > ¡1
3 js2x + s3 ¡ xj +
P
3 ¡ 1
3 jxj + 1
3P ¡ ± for x close to 0.
Note of course that as P gets very large there exist a political equilibrium in which
all groups contest. The following proposition formalizes this.
Proposition 5. There exist a value of P such that all N groups contesting the elec-




Proof. We know that there exist a value of P at which any formateur i can form a
minimal winning coalition including itself. We need to show that there exist a value
21at which in an equilibrium with all N groups forming parties, no one will deviate. The
minimum loss (assuming party i is in government only if selected to be a formateur)
to a party i by withdrawing is P
N ¡±+EuN ¡EuN¡i (EuN ¡EuN¡i denotes di®erence
in expected utility in terms of ideology implemented if party i withdraws) which is
> 0 for large P:
7. Multidimensional Analysis and comparison with the Baron
Diermeier Merlo's efficient bargaining
So far we have done a one dimensional analysis. The models of BDM (earlier
cit.) consider scenarios where there are two policy dimensions and characterize a
`symmetric case' with three parties which are equidistant from each other. While the
two dimensional model they use can be analyzed in our framework as well, the one
dimensional analysis allows us to look at the issue of `connectedness' 10of coalitions
and develop comparative static results with regard to how equilibrium coalitions could
change (from connected to disconnected or vice versa) as a function of seat share,
ideological closeness and the value of the rents from o±ce. In this section we provide
a two dimensional characterization for a symmetric 3 party case which would also
facilitate comparison with BDM. We also comment on the di®erences in the results
that they obtain with our results for the same set of ideal points. Following BDM
let the ideal points of party 1,2 and 3 be located on the vertices of an equilateral




2 ): To make
things comparable we assume that si = 1
3 for all i: We divide the regions by drawing
lines from the party's ideal points which cross at the centroid of the triangle.








:We will show that regard-
less of the identity of the formateur and the value of P minimal winning coalitions
emerge. Further, the formateur is indi®erent to the choice of a coalition partner. The
intuition is simple enough. Any formateur is unable to form a minority government









Figure 4. 2 Dimensional Case
as the other partners prefer the status quo policy to the formateur's ideal point.
However, any party asked by the formateur is willing to join as the compromised
policy (which is midway between them) is preferred by both to the status quo. This
goes through for any value of P as the seat shares are the same and there is thus no
e®ect coming from wanting to take a smaller party. We formalize this in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. Let there be three parties 1;2;3 of equal size and two policy dimen-





2 ) respectively. Let the utility function for party i be given by ¡1
2 (y1 ¡ xi)
2 ¡
1
2 (y2 ¡ zi)
2 +¸P; where y = (y1;y2) is the implemented policy. Then, for any forma-
teur i ² 1;2;3 the equilibrium government will be minimum winning. Further, i will
be indi®erent to the choice of a coalition partner.
23Proof. As the parties are located symmetrically, we can consider the case where 1
is the formateur without loss of generality. In that case 1 can propose to either 2
or 3 and in each case the utility both to the formateur and the other party will be
¡1
4 + P













2. Hence this proposal will be accepted by whoever the formateur
invites. Clearly, this also rules out supermajoritarian governments as the policy (in
this three party case) is the same as the status quo policy. Now, we only need to
check that a formateur cannot propose a minority government. This is also easy to
see as the minority government yields a utility of ¡1 for the two excluded parties
which is less than ¡1
3 + P
3. Hence, the minority government will be voted against by
the two excluded parties. Notice, that the results are the same whoever is chosen by
the formateur in the minimum winning coalition as the three parties are equidistant
from each other. Hence, the formateur is indi®erent to a choice of coalition partner.
This result contrasts with both the papers. In the static version of Diermeier
and Merlo, only minority and surplus (supermajoritarian) coalitions occur. That is
because of the particular status quo they take. Diermeier and Merlo constrain the
status quo xÁ to lie in the set ((x1;y1);(x2;y2);(x3;y3)): Baron and Diermeier (2001)
have an arbitrary status quo, in general their status quo can lie in one of the six
partitions of the triangle or even outside it. They get minimum winning coalitions
except when the status quo is very outlying. The reason is that with an outlying
status quo, coalition partners (in their framework) are willing to make large transfers
to be in the government.
An important distinction in our approach as compared to BDM is worth mention-
ing. For large enough P we necessarily get minimal winning coalitions subject to the
inclusion of the formateur. In other words when the value that parties place on rents
(or directed transfers to their own groups) as compared to ideology, we converge to
the prediction of Riker subject to inclusion of the formateur On the other hand, the
24choice of coalition in BDM is driven by the status quo and is independent of the value
of P increasing. Hence, even when P is very large they do not converge to Riker's
prediction. Both approaches have merit, however because of `e±cient bargaining'
BDM are unable to analyze how coalition structure varies as the relative importance
of ideology to `rents from o±ce' change. It is also worth noting that they also ignore
any endowment constraints. They analyze P as perks which can be freely transferred
but they do not analyze what happens when the value is small so that the transfers
required for the e±cient outcome cannot be made .In other words, their results would
vary when the constraint becomes binding (i.e. P is low).
The arbitrary status quo chosen by BDM can be generated as the status quo in
our model for di®erent seat shares as long as it lies inside the triangle. However,
all points inside are not really admissible for coalition formation as si > 1
3 for those
points to be a status quo in our model. A comparison can of course be carried out
for an arbitrary status quo in the BDM framework and compare it to what happens
if we replace their assumption of full commitment and perfect transferability with
the `no commitment' assumption that we use in our model. To rule out issues of
how P would be divided we set it to 0: We ¯nd that even when we consider the
status quo chosen by BDM in the two papers we get di®erent results if we assume no
commitment. We ¯rst analyze the case. where the status quo is the policy of any one
of the parties.. In that scenario, there are two cases to consider, one where the policy
of the formateur i is the status quo and another where j 6= i is the formateur. In the
¯rst case it is easy to see that i proposes a minority government including only itself
and all parties support it as they are indi®erent to the government's policy and the
status quo xÁ which are the same. In the second case the proposer j also proposes
a minority government and is supported by the party which is di®erent to j's policy
and the status quo as they are equidistant. Hence, the results in the static version of
their paper gives only minority governments under our assumptions.
25Now, consider the more general case which It is easy to show that only minority or
minimal winning governments can form. In each of these six regions (and assuming
xÁ 6= xi) if the party closest to the status quo is the proposer a minimal winning
coalition forms and the proposer is indi®erent to the identity of the other coalition
partner.
8. Robustness: How critical are the assumptions?
In this section we study the robustness of the equilibrium to the assumptions
we made about parliamentary rules (formateur selection procedure/ bargaining out-
comes), voting behavior and inability of parties to commit to positions other that
their ideal points. We will not deal with the last two issues except make brief re-
marks about each. However, we shall talk in some detail about two alternate ways to
model legislative behavior which are common in the literature.
8.1. Majority Rule game. Instead of the formateur selection and coalition forma-
tion procedure suppose Parliament operated by voting on each issue by majority rule.
In a single dimensional policy space this would lead to the Condorcet winner. If a
single issue is what matters to the groups we get fairly sharp results for the whole po-
litical process. Consider the arbitrary N groups and assume a unique median exists.
In that case we get the following results immediately.
Proposition 7. If after elections the median of the candidates (representing di®erent
party positions) is implemented, at most two groups put up candidates in equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that more than two candidates standing cannot be an equilibrium.
To see this note that if three (or more) candidates contest in the second stage there
will be at least one candidate who will be non pivotal i.e. whose dropping out will not
a®ect the implemented policy. hence, it is not optimal for that candidate to contest.
We now show that there can be zero, one or two candidate equilibria.
If cost are very high it is easy to see that no candidate will stand.
26To get one candidate equilibria ¯rst note that there exists a c for which if the
candidate with ideal point 0 stands, for all ²; 1-² will not ¯nd it worthwhile to contest
and win This implies that u(¡1 + ²) > P ¡ c: This implies a continuum of one
candidate equilibria where any candidate can stand in equilibrium. However, as c
decreases the range decreases i.e. the marginal candidate who can stand uncontested
moves towards the median. Further, as c decreases we can get two candidate equilibria
symmetrically around the median.11
Notice, that this contrasts with Duverger's hypothesis that PR leads to a multiparty
(more than two) system. Moreover, this range around which symmetric 2 candidate
equilibria can occur also keeps shrinking.
Proposition 8. As costs go to zero (and the median is unique) the unique equilibrium
is for the median citizen to form a party.
Proof. We need to consider only one candidate or two candidate equilibria.
Consider a 1 candidate equilibrium with a group xi 6= xm where xm is the ideal point
of the median candidate. WLOG, let xi < xm: Clearly, any j such that xi < xj · xm
can form a party and get more than half the votes. The net gain to group j is
U(xj) ¡ U(xi) + P ¡ ± > 0 when ± ! 0:
Now consider 2 candidate equilibria. We already know that they must be symmetric
around the median. Let us denote the utility to the median group in these symmetric
equilibria by U(xs): Since, the post election policy gets selected by majority rule, if
the median group deviated and formed a party it will get its ideal point in stage 2.
Hence, by deviating the median group gets U(xm) ¡ U(xs) + P ¡ ± > 0 when ± ! 0:
11We have assumed that the group sizes are the same for convenience and they are at the same
distance from their neighbors, hence 2 candidate equilibria are possible. Otherwise, as we have
shown before we need to introduce voter uncertainty to get 2 candidate equilibria.
27We already know that the median group being the only group to form a party is
an equilibria. We have shown no other equilibria exists. Hence, as cost go to zero
this is the unique equilibrium.
A comparison with plurality voting is quite interesting. For di®erent cost levels we
get one or two candidate equilibria as in the citizen candidate model with plurality
voting. As cost decrease our prediction is extremely sharp under PR unlike plurality
voting and it predicts a unique outcome. However, this seems hardly representative
of how Parliament works. In particular, even if this were taken to be a way to make
decisions we run into problems if the policy space is multidimensional. Di®erent
results obtain depending on how voting on di®erent issues take place.
8.2. Selection in order. Another rule which is sometimes seen in formateur selec-
tion (and mandated by law in Greece) is selection in order analyzed by Austen Smith
and Banks (earlier cit.). We now look at ex post coalitions under the `Selection in
order' rule (Austen Smith and Banks Protocol). Brie°y, this involves a ¯xed order of
asking parties to be the formateur-starting with the largest (in terms of vote shares)
and then if the largest fails to form a government the second largest and so on. If all
parties fail a national government is formed and the policy implemented is a status
quo policy which is implemented by a caretaker government which enjoys no power.
We now present some results which contrast with random selection.
Proposition 9. If power and entry costs are low the unique equilibrium of the political
game is for the median group to be the unique party to form.
Proof. We ¯rst show that if power is `low' in the parliamentary game only the median
party will be able to command a majority support. This is because any coalition will
have an implemented policy xj 6= xm where xm is the median party's ideal point.
Hence, a majority of members prefer xm to xj: Hence, the optimal coalition when the
median party proposes is for it to propose a coalition consisting only of itself which
28will be accepted. Therefore, the unique equilibrium of the parliamentary game is for
xm to get implemented.
Clearly, if this is the outcome in the legislature no other group will launch a party
in the party formation stage.
Proposition 10. If the status quo policy xÁ is implemented by a caretaker government
which enjoys no power, that government will not form in equilibrium.
Proof. We are required to show that at least 1 party can form a successful coalition
when it is the formateur. Notice that as xÁ lies between x1 and xn a coalition of the
median party is preferred by a majority to the status quo. So there exists a feasible
coalition which dominates the status quo.
We notice that this result contrasts with that under proportional selection. In fact,
while caretaker governments are not unheard of it is usually the case that even though
governments may not form at the ¯rst attempt it is almost always the case that some
coalition comes to power. The one shot version of the random recognition protocol by
cutting o® the game in one stage does not allow for any other party to get a chance
to propose leading to this `extreme' situation. A further insight that we get is the
following.
Corollary 1. An extreme party cannot form a minority government.
Proof. To see this notice that the middle party's minority government is preferred
by a majority of members. Thus there exists at least one coalition which Hence,
parties commanding a majority of seats will not accept the proposal of a minority
government by an extreme party.
A couple of remarks at this point are in order.
Remark 1. Minimal winning ,minority and surplus governments are possible in equi-
librium. Moreover, the coalitions may be connected or disconnected.
29The trade-o®s involved are similar to the proportional selection model.
Remark 2. The ¯rst party may not be able to form a coalition. Hence, delays may
occur in equilibrium. However, it is worth noting that for every equilibrium involving
delay there is an equilibrium without delay which leads to the same government.
Notice that the formateur may not be able to form a government including itself
and hence the o®er it makes to other parties to join a coalition with it will be turned
down. However, an equivalent outcome can be achieved by the formateur proposing
a coalition excluding itself which lies in W \ Y:
Some points of di®erence are worth noting.
First, in the random recognition protocol we may get caretaker governments as well
as minority governments. Selection in order never leads to a caretaker government
in equilibrium. Moreover, only a median party can form a minority government and
that too only when power is very low. At the empirical level, while selection in order
is not borne out, it is worth investigating if the predictions of the one period random
recognition model used in recent papers by BDM which we have adopted here as well
captures important features of the data. Clearly, ¯nite periods of these protocols
change the results but it is still not clear what institutional details correspond to
this random recognition protocol. Thus, when the largest party is not selected we
need to see if this is because a party other than the largest has indicated that it has
the support of other parties which would enable it to form a government. Another
important thing to look at is how well the `random recognition' model ¯ts the data
after accounting for an incumbency bias i.e. where the last party in power is ¯rst
asked to form the government. The `selection in order' protocol is something that
can be observed and legislated on (as in Greece). However, there is certainly a lot
to be said for this `random selection' procedure in terms of capturing the inherent
uncertainty that is associated with the political environment in government formation
30in most countries. Moreover, this random selection model of BDM we have analyzed
under modi¯ed assumptions leads to fairly interesting results.
Clearly, there are issues which are important in the political process which we
have left out. For instance, we do not consider the issue of strategic voting. As
long as representation per se is important, there are less reasons for voters to behave
strategically under PR than under plurality. There is enough evidence in the recent
runo® in the French Presidential elections to believe that voters behaved sincerely.12
Further work is certainly needed in this area. We have embedded a citizen candidate
model in the institutional framework of coalition government formation. Thus, we do
not allow parties to credibly commit to positions other than their own. Given that
parties may have access to a credible commitment device (often repeated play ensures
that, see Alesina (earlier cit.)). it would be interesting to see if this would lead to
more divergence or more convergence of party policies. This remains a fascinating
area of future research.
9. Empirical relevance and concluding remarks
We have presented a model of parliamentary democracy under PR which predicts
political coalition formation as a function of party size and the relative importance of
power to ideology. Moreover, by endogenizing the political entry stage we have shown
how our legislature is consistent with a party formation game under the assumption
of sincere voting. Our coalition and policy making stages in particular give rise to
certain predictions which contrast with those existing in the literature. In particular,
two limiting cases arise, one when parties care only for ideology and another where
the rents of o±ce become very large. We ¯nd that in the limit Riker's size principle
does apply subject to inclusion of the formateur and coalitions are minimal winning
12Candidates to the left of Jospin received enough votes which, if combined, could have ensured
Chirac's defeat.
31(though not minimum size) when the vale of rents from o±ce become very big. How-
ever, because we explicitly consider party size, `disconnected coalitions' can occur
even with parties which are purely driven by ideology. Thus, when parties care only
for ideology they may leave out an ideologically close partner because a large party
can tilt the policy too close towards its ideal point because of its increased bargaining
strength.
We can usefully compare our paper to the papers by BDM which use e±cient
bargaining and perfect commitment within the coalition. Given any coalition, our
model predicts a policy orientation that is skewed towards larger parties while BDM
predicts that party size will be irrelevant. This stems from the bargaining procedure
in BDM giving equal weights to all parties. With di®erent weights in proportion to
size, our results in this regard will match. The more fundamental di®erence comes
from the assumption of no commitment which leads to substantive di®erences in
predictions for coalitions for a given a composition of the legislature. Empirically, we
do not believe that perfect commitment or the converse are observed. However, our
results are robust to some degree of commitment. We believe that apart from the
usefulness of analyzing the polar opposite of BDM, no commitment at the coalition
formation stage is often a good approximation-this implies that the proposer cannot
make a take it or leave it o®er such that anything in the status quo's majority win set
would be accepted. This seems consistent with the observed phenomenon of power
sharing that is seen in coalitions around the world. As we had pointed out earlier
Laver and Scho¯eld (earlier cit.) state that cabinet seats being allotted roughly in
proportion to seat shares is one of the most observed empirical regularities of coalition
governments. They also provide a discussion for why at the coalition formation stage
the manifestos written are not binding and that actual policies are a result of intricate
bargaining inside the coalition.13 Hence, both as an approximation to what happens
13See also Laver and Shepsle (1995).
32in the real world and in terms of predictive power we argue that no commitment is
not a bad assumption.
Another issue that we address, but which BDM cannot (because of their assump-
tion of e±cient bargaining) is the ideological connectedness of coalitions as functions
of power. We are not aware of too many studies which look at this systematically.
A paper by Indridason (2001) examines the nature of disconnected coalitions in the
context of a few northern European countries and tentatively concludes that this is
related to whether the o±ce seeking model is more appropriate or whether the coali-
tion is governed by ideological considerations. Our model makes a set of predictions
which are more precise and can provide a useful basis for further case studies along
these lines. In fact, another recent paper by Indridason (2003)14 presents some em-
pirical tests on `clientelism' and coalition structure. While his `clientelism' may not
be the only way to think about we call political power, it provides an interesting set
of hypothesis about how coalition structure depends on the degree of `o±ce seeking'
motives of politicians. It is certainly worth looking at some of our predictions using
the same dataset.
An extremely important issue is the formateur selection procedure. Diermeier and
Merlo (2001) provide the ¯rst systematic empirical study but they study only the ¯rst
stage i.e. they look at whether it is the case that the ¯rst party is always asked to form
the government against the alternate that this is roughly in proportion to seat shares
and ¯nd empirical support for the latter. However, some things are worth further
investigation-when the party elected to be the formateur is not the largest it is worth
looking at whether they have informally waived the right to form the government.
Moreover, whether it is the case that the party selected to be the formateur has an
informal pre electoral understanding with a set of parties which together can win a
majority in parliament. Also, given an incumbency bias in selection we need to check
14Kalandrakis (2002) also does an empirical analysis of coalitions though his empirical analysis
is restricted to minority governments.
33how well the two alternatives perform after controlling for that. Another issue worth
pursuing is to see how well proportional selection ¯ts the data after controlling for the
number of parties. These issues together with a more speci¯c procedure incorporating
institutional details of bargaining among parties inside a coalition will lead the way
to a more complete understanding of formateur selection considerations as well as
why delays in bargaining over government formation occur.
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